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What the Church has said about Divine Eternity

Andromeda Galaxy (official NASA image)

This page features statements by Christian theologians and institutions about the nature of God’s eternity. It is a companion resource to my long-form essay “Introduction to Divine Eternity”. While that article focused on my own opinions as justified by scripture and scientific principles, this collection of quotations helps to establish the Church’s teaching throughout history, particularly as it relates to the question of temporal succession in God’s existence.

For the purposes of this collection, I am only including ecumenical statements of faith and the work of Reformed theologians—that is, those in the tradition of the Swiss Reformers, flowing into the Presbyterian and continental Reformed churches holding to the Westminster Confession of Faith and the Three Forms of Unity (Heidelberg Catechism, Belgic Confession, Canons of Dordt). You will therefore find no quotes by Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, or Aquinas here, though any of those men could provide us with interesting thoughts on the subject.

You will notice many similarities with my own views, but do be on the lookout for differences in the quotations of Charles Hodge, who approaches the issue using his conception of personhood. All italics are my addition unless they are a single word, phrase, or title. Obviously, this selection of quotes does not represent the totality of Reformed thought, but only some snippets from important works of systematic theology or other considerations of theology proper.

Ecumenical Creeds and Reformed Confessions

  • The Nicene Creed, in stating that the Son was “begotten by the Father before all ages”, implies God’s eternality.[1]
  • The Athanasian Creed affirms the following: “The Father eternal, the Son eternal, and the Holy Spirit eternal. And yet they are not three eternals but one eternal.”[2]
  • The Heidelberg Catechism says “…these three distinct persons are one, true, eternal God.”[3]
  • The Belgic Confession likewise states that there is “a single and simple spiritual being, whom we call God—eternal…”[4]
  • One of the best statements of theology proper comes from the Westminster Confession of Faith. “There is but one only, living, and true God, who is infinite in being and perfection, a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions; immutable, immense, eternal…”[5]

John Calvin

“The predestination by which God adopts some to the hope of life, and adjudges others to eternal death, no man who would be thought pious ventures simply to deny; but it is greatly caviled at, especially by those who make prescience its cause. We, indeed, ascribe both prescience and predestination to God; but we say, that it is absurd to make the latter subordinate to the former. When we attribute prescience to God, we mean that all things always were, and ever continue, under his eye; that to his knowledge there is no past or future, but all things are present, and indeed so present, that it is not merely the idea of them that is before him (as those objects are which we retain in our memory), but that he truly sees and contemplates them as actually under his immediate inspection.”[6]

Francis Turretin

The infinity of God in reference to duration is called eternity to which these three things are ascribed: (1) that it is without beginning; (2) without end; (3) without succession (i.e., the duration of a thing as to priority and posteriority, as to present, past and future). The question here properly is not whether God is eternal with reference to the two former (i.e., whether he is without beginning and end)…The question concerns the third—whether his eternity is without succession or whether it is subject to the differences of time as they [Socius and Vorstius] pretend…We maintain that God is free from every difference of time, and no less from succession than from beginning and end.[7]

“…nothing flows away with time from the life of God as from ours. God has every moment at once whatever we have dividedly by succession of time. Hence philosophers have well said that neither the future nor the past (he will be or was), but only the present (he is) can properly be applied to him.For the eternal duration of God embraces indeed all time—the past, present and future; but nothing in him can be past or future because his life remains always the same and immutable…The indivisible eternity of God embraces all divisible times, not coextensively or formally, but eminently and indivisibly. Thus the immense God embraces in his immensity all the extended and divisible parts of the world (although indivisible in his nature) because wherever he is, he is wholly.”[8]

“When the actions of God are considered either as past or present or future, this is said not with respect to the efficient reason, but in reference to the effects and objects (which are produced in diverse times and on which his acts are terminated)…Time and eternity are not related to each other as part and whole, but as species of duration mutually opposed. Eternity always was and will be. However, time neither always was nor always will be, but will cease with the world.”[9]

Stephen Charnock

“He was before the world, yet he neither began nor ends; he is not a temporary, but an eternal God; it takes in both parts of eternity, what was before the creation of the world, and what is after; though the eternity of God be one permanent state, without succession, yet the spirit of God, suiting himself to the weakness of our conception, divides it into two parts; one past before the foundation of the world, another to come after the destruction of the world; as he did exist before all ages, and as he will exist after all ages.[10]

“Eternity is a perpetual duration, which hath neither beginning nor end; time hath both. Those things we say are in time that have beginning, grow up by degrees, have succession of parts; eternity is contrary to time, and is therefore a permanent and immutable state; a perfect possession of life without any variation; it comprehends in itself all years, all ages, all periods of ages; it never begins; it endures after every duration of time, and never ceaseth; it doth as much outrun time, as it went before the beginning of it: time supposeth something before it; but there can be nothing before eternity; it were not then eternity. Time hath a continual succession; the former time passeth away and another succeeds: the last year is not this year, nor this year the next. We must conceive of eternity contrary to the notion of time; as the nature of time consists in the succession of parts, so the nature of eternity in an infinite immutable duration. Eternity and time differ as the sea and rivers; the sea never changes place, and is always one water; but the rivers glide along, and are swallowed up in the sea; so is time by eternity.”[11]

Eternity is a negative attribute, and is a denying of God any measures of time, as immensity is a denying of him any bounds of place. As immensity is the diffusion of his essence, so eternity is the duration of his essence; and when we say God is eternal, we exclude from him all possibility of beginning and ending, all flux and change. As the essence of God cannot be bounded by any place, so it is not to be limited by any time: as it is his immensity to be everywhere, so it is his eternity to be alway.”[12]

Time began with the foundation of the world; but God being before time, could have no beginning in time. Before the beginning of the creation, and the beginning of time, there could be nothing but eternity; nothing but what was uncreated, that is, nothing but what was without beginning. To be in time is to have a beginning; to be before all time is never to have a beginning, but always to be; for as between the Creator and creatures there is no medium, so between time and eternity there is no medium.”[13]

“The being of creatures is successive; the being of God is permanent, and remains entire with all its perfections unchanged in an infinite duration. Indeed, the first notion of eternity is to be without beginning and end, which notes to us the duration of a being in regard of its existence; but to have no succession, nothing first or last, notes rather the perfection of a being in regard of its essence.[14]

“His years do not fail (Heb. i. 12), his years do not come and go as others do; there is not this day, to‑morrow, or yesterday, with him. As nothing is past or future with him in regard of knowledge, but all things are present, so nothing is past or future in regard of his essence.He is not in his essence this day what he was not before, or will be the next day and year what he is not now. All his perfections are most perfect in him every moment; before all ages, after all ages.”[15]

“Some illustrate the difference between eternity and time by the similitude of a tree, or a rock standing upon the side of a river, or shore of the sea; the tree stands always the same and unmoved, while the waters of the river glide along at the foot. The flux is in the river, but the tree acquires nothing but a diverse respect and relation of presence to the various parts of the river as they flow. The waters of the river press on, and push forward one another, and what the river had this minute, it hath not the same the next.”[16]

“He sees all things sliding under him in a continual variation; he beholds the revolutions in the world without any change of his most glorious and immovable nature. All other things pass from one state to another; from their original, to their eclipse and destruction; but God possesses his being in one indivisible point, having neither beginning, end, nor middle.[17]

There is no succession in the decrees of God. He doth not decree this now, which he decreed not before; for as his works were known from the beginning of the world, so his works were decreed from the beginning of the world; as they are known at once, so they are decreed at once; there is a succession in the execution of them; first grace, then glory; but the purpose of God for the bestowing of both, was in one and the same moment of eternity.”[18]

“Eternity is only proper to God, and not communicable. It is as great a madness to ascribe eternity to the creature, as to deprive the Lord of the creature of eternity.”[19]

“If eternity be one indivisible point, and is not diffused into preceding and succeeding parts, then that which is known in it or by it is perceived without any succession, for knowledge is as the substance of the person knowing; if that hath various actions and distinct from itself, then it understands things in differences of time as time presents them to view. But, since God’s being depends not upon the revolutions of time, so neither does his knowledge; it exceeds all motions of years and days, comprehends infinite spaces of past and future. God considers all things in his eternity in one simple knowledge, as if they were now acted before him.[20]

Herman Bavinck

When applied to time, God’s immutability is called eternity; when applied to space, it is called omnipresence. From time to time the two have been included under the umbrella term of ‘divine infinity.’”[21]

The marks of the concept of eternity are three: it excludes a beginning, an end, and the succession of moments. God is unbegotten and incorruptible but also immutable. Between eternity and time there is a distinction not only in quantity and degree but also in quality and essence.”[22]

“Accordingly, the essential nature of time is not that either with respect to the earlier or the later it is finite or endless, but that it encompasses a succession of moments, that there is in it a period that is past, a period that is present, and a period that comes later. But from this it follows that time—intrinsic time—is the mode of existence that is characteristic of all created and finite beings. One who says ‘time’ says motion, change measurability, computability, limitation, finiteness, creature. Time is the duration of creaturely existence.[23]

“God is not a process of becoming but an eternal being. He is without beginning and end, but also knows no earlier and later. He can neither be subjected to measuring or counting in his duration.”[24]

“Nevertheless, God’s eternity should not for that reason be conceived as an eternally static, immobile moment of time. On the contrary: it is identical with God’s being and hence with his fullness of being. Not only is God eternal; he is his own eternity.”[25]

Time is concomitant of created existence. It is not self-originated. Eternal time, a time without beginning, is not conceivable. God, the eternal One, is the only absolute cause of time. In and by itself time cannot exist or endure: it is a continuous becoming and must rest in immutable being. It is God who by his eternal power sustains time, both in its entirety and in each separate moment of it. God pervades time and every moment of time with his eternity. In every second throbs the heartbeat of eternity. Hence, God maintains a definite relation to time, entering into it with his eternity. Also, for him time is objective. In his eternal consciousness he knows time as a whole as well as the succession of all its moments. But this fact does not make him temporal, that is, subject to time, measure, or number. He remains eternal and inhabits eternity, but uses time with a view to manifesting this eternal thoughts and perfections. He makes time subservient to eternity and thus proves himself to be the King of the ages (1 Tim. 1:17).[26]

Charles Hodge

“The only thing open to question in these statements is, the denial of all succession in the divine consciousness. Our idea of eternity is arrived at from our idea of time. We are conscious of existence in space, and we are conscious of protracted or continuous existence. The ideas of space and duration are necessarily given in the consciousness of continuous existence. We see also that events succeed each other, that their occurrence is separated by a longer or shorter period of duration, just as bodies are separated by a greater or less interval in space. We therefore know, from consciousness or from experience, of no kind of duration which is not successive. Instead of saying, as is commonly done, that time is duration measured by succession, which supposes that duration is antecedent to that by which it is measured, and independent of it, it is maintained by some that duration without succession is inconceivable and impossible. As space is defined to be ‘negation betwixt the boundary-lines of form,’ so time is said to be ‘the negation betwixt the boundary-points of motion.’ Or, in other words, time is ‘the interval which a body in motion marks in its transit from one point of space to another.’ Hence, if there be no bodies having form, there is no space; and if there is no motion, there is no time. ‘If all things were annihilated, time as well as space must be annihilated; for time is dependent on space. If all things were annihilated, there could be no transition, no succession of one object with respect to another; for there would be no object in being,—all would be perfect emptiness, nothingness, non-being-ness. Under an entire annihilation, there could be neither space nor time.’ The same writer elsewhere says, ‘Were the earth, as well as the other globes of space, annihilated, ranch more would time be annihilated therewith.’ All this, however, is to be understood, it is said, of ‘objective time, that is, of time as dependent upon created material conditions.’ As objective timelessness follows from the annihilation of material existences, so timelessness as regards thinking personalities is conceivable only on the destruction of thought. ‘We have seen that there can be a state of timelessness for material creation, only by destroying its operation, that is, its attribute of motion: precisely in analogy therewith, there can be a state of timelessness for intellectual creation, only by destroying the laws of intellect, that is, its operation of thinking.’ If, therefore, God be a person, or a thinking Being, He cannot be timeless; there must be succession; one thought or state must follow another. To deny this, it is said, is to deny the personality of God. The dictum, therefore, of the schoolmen, and of the theologians, that eternity precludes succession—that it is a persistent, unmoving Now—is according to this repudiated. There are, however, two senses in which succession is denied to God. The first has reference to external events. They are ever present to the mind of God. He views them in all their relations, whether causal or chronological. He sees how they succeed each other in time, as we see a passing pageant, all of which we may take in in one view. In this there is perhaps nothing which absolutely transcends our comprehension. The second aspect of the subject concerns the relation of succession to the thoughts and acts of God. When we are ignorant, it is wise to be silent. We have no right to affirm or deny, when we cannot know what our affirmation or denial may involve or imply. We know that God is constantly producing new effects, effects which succeed each other in time; but we do not know that these effects are due to successive exercises of the divine efficiency. It is, indeed, incomprehensible to us how it should be otherwise. The miracles of Christ were due to the immediate exercise of the divine efficiency. We utter words to which we can attach no meaning, when we say that these effects were due, not to a contemporaneous act or volition of the divine mind, but to an eternal act, if such a phrase be not a solecism. In like manner we are confounded when we are told that our prayers are not heard and answered in time—that God is timeless—that what He does in hearing and answering prayer, and in his daily providence. He does from eternity. It is certain that God is subject to all the limitations of personality, if there be any. But as such limitations are the conditions of his being a person and not a mere involuntary force, they are the conditions of his infinite perfection. As constant thought and activity are involved in the very nature of a spirit, these must belong to God; and so far as thinking and acting involve succession, succession must belong to God.”[27]

“Whether we can understand how there can be succession in the thoughts of Him who inhabits eternity or not, we are not to deny that God is an intelligent Being, that He actually thinks and feels, in order to get over the difficulty. God is a person, and all that personality implies must be true of Him.”[28]

Gerhardus Vos:

“23. What is God’s eternity? That attribute of God whereby He is exalted above all limitations of time and all succession of time, and in a single indivisible present possesses the content of His life perfectly (and as such is the cause of time).

24. How many concepts of eternity are there? Two: a)​A more popular concept: Eternity as time without beginning and without end. b)​The more abstract and more precisely defined concept: Eternity is something that lies above time and differs entirely from time. c)​Both belong together and serve to supplement each other. According to the first, time in itself would be the original, and eternity only an extension of time. The latter taken to an extreme brings us to the pantheistic error that time is only an alteration of eternity. But both exist, eternity in God, time in the world. Scripture has both descriptions of eternity: Psalm 102:12; 90:2, 4; 2 Peter 3:8.

25. What question presents itself to us here? How God can have knowledge of temporal things, without, with this knowledge, time, as it were, penetrating God’s thinking and thereby His entire being? In other words: How does God relate to time?

26. What must the answer to this be? a)​That we may not follow those who deny a real existence to time and space and think that they are merely subjective forms in which man represents things. So Kant and many others. Time and space are objective and real. b)​That it is difficult to decide whether time and space are independent entities or modes of existence, or are relations of things to each other, or an entirely different kind of reality, or something about which we can say nothing further. These questions belong to the realm of metaphysics. God’s Word does not give a further explanation. c)​That time and space as realities are also realities for God, the existence of which He knows. d)​That, however, a great difference remains between the relationship in which we stand to these realities and in which God stands to the same realities. We have time and space not only as real outside us, but they are also created in our mind as forms for representation, so that our inner life is governed by them and we cannot be rid of them. We can only see in space and think in time. For God it is entirely different. His divine life does not unfold or exist in those forms. He is exalted above them and just that fact makes His eternity His omnipresence. He knows the finite as existing in time and space, but He does not know and see it in a temporal or spatial manner.

27. Is it right to say that all ‘occurring’ takes place in time and that thus there must also be passage of time in God? No, for we know that there is causing and being caused, thus a real occurring, outside of time, namely, in the generation of the Son and the spirating of the Holy Spirit.[29]

Louis Berkhof:

“We should remember, however, that in speaking as it does the Bible uses popular language, and not the language of philosophy. We generally think of God’s eternity in the same way, namely, as duration infinitely prolonged both backwards and forwards. But this is only a popular and symbolical way of representing that which in reality transcends time and differs from it essentially. Eternity in the strict sense of the word is ascribed to that which transcends all temporal limitations.[30]

“Our existence is marked off by days and weeks and months and years; not so the existence of God. Our life is divided into a past, present and future, but there is no such division in the life of God. He is the eternal ‘I am.’ His eternity may be defined as that perfection of God whereby He is elevated above all temporal limits and all succession of moments, and possesses the whole of His existence in one indivisible present. The relation of eternity to time constitutes one of the most difficult problems in philosophy and theology, perhaps incapable of solution in our present condition.[31]

Richard Muller:

“On this point, the Reformed orthodox offer several forms of statement, differently nuanced: some simply argue that eternity is uniformly present to all of time in such a way that events, which are future and therefore not actual for finite creatures, are not future but present to eternal God and, therefore, are known to him as actual —and others offer the qualification or elaboration, often associate with Scotus, that each moment in time, although always present to all of eternity, is nevertheless not simultaneously existent with any other moment in time, since that would de-temporalize things and remove their succession. In any case, the doctrine does not imply that, in eternity, all times coexist non-temporally with one another and that eternity is a denial of time — but that eternity, given that it is a duration, coexists with all times without disrupting or confusing the times of individual things…This doctrine, as it stands, does not fall precisely into the modern category either of a radically ‘timeless God’ or of an ‘everlasting God’ nonetheless ‘in time.Eternity is not ‘timelessness,’ the term favored in many modern discussions of the issue, but a successionless existence immediately related to all moments of time or, more precisely, a successionless duration directly related to temporal succession: after all, it is defined not as an ‘absolute’ but as a ‘relative’ attribute.”[32]

“The assumption of succession in God would necessarily imply that in God some things are prior, others posterior in order — by implication, subject to change and flux, given what can be called the ‘foundation’ or ground of succession in the movement from prior to posterior.”[33]

“At the root of the Reformed orthodox argument for divine eternity lie the issues of change and succession and the relationship of unchanging God to things that change and succeed one another: the argument is couched precisely for the purpose of denying change and succession in God while at the same time insisting on a relationship between God and temporal creatures. The historical sources do not offer a doctrine of ‘timeless eternity’ if that is taken to mean a doctrine of eternal being unrelated to time and incapable of dealing with temporal events as temporal — indeed, as already noted, eternity is understood not as an absolute, but as a relative attribute. The Reformed orthodox assume a direct and necessary relationship between God and the temporal order (as ought to be expected given their doctrines of creation, providence, and divine concursus) at the same time that they deny change and succession in God. In all of the cited arguments, the denial of change and succession is made for the sake of affirming a specific relationship between God and creatures — indeed, of affirming that both God and creatures have duration, the divine duration being non-successive, the creaturely duration, successive. This in itself ought to make readers of the seventeenth-century documents wary of modern generalizations concerning ‘timeless eternity.’ Indeed, the Synopsis purioris theologiae indicates that God is without (expers) end or terminus, not that he is lacking or without time: his essence is such that he contains or possesses ‘no limit’ of essence, magnitude, places, or times — specifically, in the doctrine of eternity, without ‘limitation of time’ or ‘circumscription of time.’”[34]

“There are some differences of formulation among the Reformed: some, like Pictet, do not distinguish clearly between successive and non-successive duration and, as a result, do not stress the relationship between God and the temporal order in their discussions of eternity, while others, by far the majority, like the authors of the Leiden Synopsis, Turretin, Charnock, Ridgley, and Rijssen, specifically define eternity as an infinite and successionless duration, standing beyond but nonetheless in relation to time.[35]

“Resident in the scholastic concept of eternity, at least in what appears to be the view of the majority of the Reformed orthodox writers, there is a distinction parallel to that between immensity and omnipresence — namely, between eternity utterly apart from time because prior to the creation of time, eternity strictly so-called; and eternity in relation to the temporal sequence, eternity understood as everlasting duration.”[36]

“The resultant model, if scanned in the same manner as the first member of divine infinity (viz., immensity and omnipresence), yields a second member of the distinction consisting in eternity and everlasting duration, with eternity as the exact analogue of immensity and everlasting duration as the exact analogue of omnipresence. The distinction, then, is between the infinitude of the divine essence considered in itself, apart from creation, and either the eternity of God as contrasted with the temporal limitation of creation or the everlasting duration of the divine essence considered in its relation to the temporal order.The intrinsic infinitude of God can be understood, extrinsically or ad extra, either as the ultimate absence of temporal and spatial limitation, namely, eternity and immensity, or as the everlasting duration and omnipresence of God in his relationship to both time and space.”[37]

“In the older theological vocabulary, everlastingness or sempiternity denotes a duration in relation to the ages of the world, whereas eternity and its correlate, everlasting duration, indicate the specifically divine duration, apart from or prior to the existence of finite things and, therefore, capable of transcending the encumbrances of time. This distinction between infinity and eternity or everlasting duration, like that between infinity and immensity or omnipresence, is not, of course, a distinction between attributes: it is a distinction concerning a single attribute made between an intrinsic and two extrinsic considerations. In terms of the rules for the predication of attributes, everlasting duration and omnipresence stand as descriptions of God grounded in our understanding of God’s relation to objects ad extra. Such distinctions point us back toward the issues encountered in the initial statement of the problems of predication.”[38]

Perhaps the obvious point ought to be made that the orthodox tradition, including the Reformers and the Protestant scholastics, held to the Augustinian conception of time as the mutation of the finite order and not as an objective reality or ‘thing,’ an assumption which was disputed toward the end of the seventeenth century by various Newtonians. The traditional categories of predication make this point abundantly: time or temporality is not res or substantia but rather, like quantity, quality, disposition, relation, or spatiality, is a predicate of a thing or substance. And, in the case of God, like all other predicates belonging to this secondary or incidental mode, time cannot be predicated properly of God. The question, then, is not whether God, as an a-temporal (or non-successive) being, can be related to time, but whether God, as an a-temporal being can be related to temporal being.The question is analogous to the question of the relation of immaterial to material being or of non-spatial to spatial being — inasmuch as neither materiality nor spatiality are things. Thus, to say that God is not ‘in time’ or, more precisely, to indicate that temporality is not a divine attribute or property, is not to remove God from contact with an objective reality but rather to say that in his enduring relationship to all ad extra objective reality, God does not experience mutation or succession in himself: not that God is ‘timeless’ or ‘without time,’ but rather he is ‘without succession [yet] near to the differentiations of time.’ Temporal succession is merely the sign of mutation of the finite order. Duration, by way of contrast, represents a relationship to or presence within the finite order apart from the problem of mutation — or in the case of finite things that endure, a presence within the finite order that is subject to relatively less mutation.Given that the divine relationship to the finite is characterized by duration without succession, there is in the duration itself a ground for conceiving the relationship of God to finite things characterized by duration, albeit with mutation and succession. This understanding of eternity and time quite consciously on the part of the orthodox voids the objection that an eternal being cannot know what is happening in a given moment as distinct from what is happening in another moment.”[39]


[1] Nicene Creed. https://www.crcna.org/welcome/beliefs/creeds/nicene-creed

[2] Athanasian Creed. https://www.ccel.org/creeds/athanasian.creed.html

[3] Heidelberg Catechism, Q.25. https://www.crcna.org/welcome/beliefs/confessions/heidelberg-catechism

[4] Belgic Confession, Article 1. https://www.crcna.org/welcome/beliefs/confessions/belgic-confession

[5] Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter 2, Article 1. https://www.opc.org/wcf.html#Chapter_02

[6] Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge (Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2008), 609-10.

[7] Turretin, Francis. Institutes of Elenctic Theology, Vol. 1, trans. George Musgrave Giger, ed. James T. Dennison, Jr. (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1992), 202.

[8] Turretin, 203-4.

[9] Turretin, 204.

[10] Charnock, Stephen. The Existence and Attributes of God, Kindle edition (Louisville, KY: GLH Publishing, 2013), location 6260.

[11] Charnock, 6289.

[12] Charnock, 6315.

[13] Charnock, 6331.

[14] Charnock, 6372.

[15] Charnock, 6377.

[16] Charnock, 6386.

[17] Charnock, 6400.

[18] Charnock, 6414.

[19] Charnock, 6570.

[20] Charnock, 6639.

[21] Bavinck, Herman. Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. II – God and Creation, trans. John Vriend, ed. John Bolt (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), 159.

[22] Bavinck, 162.

[23] Bavinck, 163.

[24] Bavinck, 163.

[25] Bavinck, 163.

[26] Bavinck, 164.

[27] Hodge, Charles. Systematic Theology, Kindle edition (Louisville, KY: GLH Publishing, 2015), location 7319-52.

[28] Hodge, 7366.

[29] Vos, 233-60.

[30] Berkhof, Louis. Systematic Theology, Kindle edition (Escondido, CA: Ephesians Four Group, 2017), 38.

[31] Berkhof, 39.

[32] Muller, Richard A. Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. III – The Divine Essence and Attributes (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 348.

[33] Muller, 350.

[34] Muller, 354-5.

[35] Muller, 356.

[36] Muller, 356-7.

[37] Muller, 359.

[38] Muller, 359-60.

[39] Muller, 360-1.

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