Today I will attempt to explain one of the most knotty and controversial principles in the theology of Thomas Aquinas: the analogy of being between God and creatures, also known by its Latin name, analogia entis. Much ink has been spilt over this concept, yet the discussion can seem inaccessible to the average lay person. The basic idea is simple enough, but it is linked with complicated aspects of metaphysics and cannot be fully understood without some knowledge of medieval scholastic theology. As a result, most people will never know or care about the analogy of being.
Despite this, you will find some theologians, particularly within the Reformed world, who are firmly opposed to the assertion that an analogy of being exists between God and creatures. Among the most famous critics of this principle in an American Reformed context was Cornelius Van Til. However, were we to consider the issue on a global scale, the most prominent critic of the analogy of being in the 20th century was surely the Swiss Neo-orthodox theologian Karl Barth, who famously debated Erich Przywara on this very subject in the 1930s. It was Barth who left us with perhaps the most headline-grabbing comment about the analogy of being in history. “I regard the analogia entis as the invention of the antichrist, and I believe that because of it, it is impossible ever to become a Roman Catholic, all other reasons for not doing so being to my mind short-sighted and trivial.”[1]
When one reads a comment like that from such an influential modern theologian, it begs the question, just what is so terrible about the analogy of being that the Protestant Barth, when he had to choose his number one reason for not being a Catholic, did not mention anything about justification, papal authority, the veneration of saints, or the sacraments, but opted instead for this more obscure metaphysical concept? On the other hand, perhaps my readers will be more concerned to know why a number of conservative Reformed scholars consider themselves Thomists in terms of metaphysics if Aquinas was in league with the antichrist or at least veering sharply from the truth of scripture.
My goal in this essay is to determine what Thomas Aquinas taught about the analogy of being. In the future, I hope to give special consideration to how it linked with his notion of divine participation, as that has been a chief source of criticism among Protestants. I also hope to examine the criticisms of Cornelius Van Til and how other Reformed theologians have received this portion of Aquinas’ thought, but life with a new baby makes such things difficult. Come back in ten years, perhaps.
If you are in the mood for some light reading, this is probably not for you, but if you are prepared for a deep dive to learn more about Christian theology, then I welcome you to sit back with your favorite snack or beverage and watch me attempt to engage with one of the most influential theologians of all time. I may succeed or fail spectacularly, and either could be entertaining in its own right.[2]
Initial Considerations
Thomas of Aquino (1225-1274), better known as Thomas Aquinas, was a friar in the Dominican order who devoted much of his life to theological and philosophical consideration. His vast body of work includes examples of scriptural exegesis, literary commentary, systematic theology, and various tractates and disputations. The most popular and famous of these works have all been translated into English, but some are only available in the original Latin. Although his writings were condemned by the bishop of Paris in the 1270s and he was quite controversial for a time, his prestige as a philosopher and scholar rose over the next few centuries. For his substantial contributions to theology, the Roman Catholic Church eventually named him one of the revered Doctors of the Church in 1567, and he is often referenced by the sobriquet “The Angelic Doctor”.
When considering Aquinas’ concept of the analogy of being, the first task is simply to find it amid his substantial output of writing. The exact term analogia entis does not appear there: it is a name coined later to describe Aquinas’ teachings about an analogy between the divine Creator and his creatures. Among the best sources for defining the concept as Thomas understood it are the Summa Theologiae, Summa Contra Gentiles, Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei, Ente et Essentia, Compendium Theologiae, Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, Commentary on the Metaphysics, and Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics.[3] Yet, even if you were to read everything related to the topic of analogy in those works of Aquinas, you would still be left with the thorny task of interpretation. Not only must the original Latin be translated properly into other vernacular languages, but one must understand exactly how Aquinas used various terms within his historical context.
Even for the trained scholar, this is no small task. Over the centuries, there has been a fierce debate among Thomistic scholars over the exact meaning and implications of the analogia entis. As a recent author on the subject, Stephen A. Long, comments, “The internecine controversies within Thomism over the nature of the analogy of being are famous…”[4] That does not bode well for the lay person, pastor, or beginning academic who wishes to understand what Aquinas meant. I think it safe to say, given the number of contradictory opinions on the subject, that some people are getting it wrong.
Additionally, part of the problem is caused by the sheer amount of material Aquinas produced throughout his lifetime. Earlier works, such as Ente et Essentia (On Being and Essence) and the commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences do not reflect the thinking of a mature Aquinas in the manner of the Summa Theologiae. While there may not be outright contradictions brought about by this chronological progression of Aquinas’ thinking, there are certainly differences of emphasis and even terminology. Thus, one could be left with a different assessment of the analogy of being depending on which sources one consults or how one chooses to weigh his earlier comments against his later comments. The best way to conduct a definitive analysis of the topic is surely to consult all of the relevant works in-depth. Only then can one hope to view the complete picture correctly.
The Issue of Predication
When considering an issue as big as the analogia entis, it is perhaps best to fall back upon the old adage: “Q: How do you eat an elephant? A: One bite at a time.” I believe this question and answer format would suit the Angelic Doctor. For my first metaphorical bite, allow me to explain the different types of predication used in medieval theology.
A predicate is defined by Merriam-Webster as follows: “1a: something that is affirmed or denied of the subject in a proposition of logic. b: a term designating a property or relation.” Predication is then the act of defining the properties or relations of a thing through the logical process of denial or affirmation. Although this has implications for multiple aspects of philosophy and logic, our interest is in how things are predicated of both God and creatures.
Example: If we say that God is good and ice cream is also good, are we using the word good in the same manner? If not in exactly the same manner, is it a related manner? If so, how are the two uses related?
Medieval scholars came up with three primary types of predication when two or more things are referenced using the same term. First, the predication can be univocal, meaning that the words are used in exactly the same manner. In our previous example, this would mean that God is good in exactly the same way that ice cream is good. A second form of predication is equivocal, meaning that although the words used to describe the two things are the same, they have completely unrelated meanings. To return again to our example, this would mean that when we call God good we are not using the word good to mean anything like the same thing as when we say ice cream is good.
The third form of predication is titled analogical. Here God is not good in exactly the same way that ice cream is good, but there is some kind of analogy between the way God is related to the word good and ice cream is related to the same word. That is to say, the meanings are not completely opposed or unrelated, but neither should we conclude that God’s goodness is just like the goodness of ice cream.
The form of predication used to describe two things can also describe the relationship between them, if indeed such a relationship exists. Whereas equivocal predication implies no relationship between the two things in question, the analogical and univocal forms of predication imply varying degrees or types of relationship. Medieval theologians loved debating the issue of relation. Indeed, their considerations grew so technical that were I to gift you some of their works on the subject, you may never find yourself in need of a sleep aid again. That does not change the fact that relationships matter from a metaphysical standpoint. How we think about relations determines how we think about the relationship between God and creatures, to give one important example. This is the context in which Aquinas typically takes up the issue of predication.
Predication between God and Creatures in Scotus’ Writings
The scholastic theologians[5] of the medieval period were not of one mind when it came to how terms should be predicated between God and creatures. One of the intellectual giants of the period, Duns Scotus (1266-1308, not to be confused with the much earlier scholar John Scotus Eriugena) was convinced that univocal predication was possible in certain cases.
“Secondly, I say that God is conceived not only in a concept analogous to the concept of a creature, that is, one which is wholly other than that which is predicated of creatures, but even in some concept univocal to Himself and to a creature. And lest there be a dispute about the name ‘univocation’, I designate that concept univocal which possesses sufficient unity in itself, so that to affirm and deny it of one and the same thing would be a contradiction.”[6]
In this quotation, Scotus makes three statements that are worthy of our consideration. First, he defines analogous predication in reference to God and creatures as “one which is wholly other than that which is predicated of creatures”. I am not convinced that this is the definition in use by many other scholastic theologians, including Aquinas. It seems closer to the definition of equivocal predication. We should keep that in mind when evaluating Scotus’ position.
Second, Scotus affirms that univocal predication is possible between the Creator and his creatures. In this, he went further than many of his theological contemporaries. However, it is clear in this passage that Scotus does not believe all predication between God and creatures is solely univocal. Notice how he begins by saying “God is conceived not only in a concept analogous to the concept of a creature”, but “in some concept univocal to Himself and to a creature”. (emphasis added) I conclude that Scotus believed that there were elements of both analogical and univocal predication between God and creatures.
He may have reached this conclusion because of the third point of interest in this passage: his definition of “univocation”. Here Scotus writes clearly that a univocal concept “possesses sufficient unity in itself, so that to affirm and deny it of one and the same thing would be a contradiction”. Again, this definition does not seem to be the same one used by most of Scotus’ contemporaries, who believed that you could affirm goodness of both God and man without those terms being univocal due to the possibility of analogy and participation. (More on both concepts to come…)
Scotus’ definition of univocation, which seems rather broad, caused him to push farther in the univocal direction. As we are about to see, such a thing was unacceptable to Aquinas.
Univocal Predication according to Aquinas
While the writings of Thomas Aquinas are both numerous and complex, presenting a challenge for anyone to wade through, one thing is constant among them: Aquinas denies the possibility of univocal predication between the Creator and his creation. He makes these denials frequently, consistently, and clearly. Let us begin by examining a passage from his most famous work, the Summa Theologiae (also called the Summa Theologica, roughly translated into English as “Summation/Summary of Theology”). Written mostly in the early 1270s, it represents some of his more mature thought.
“Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly.”[7]
Aquinas’ argument here against univocal predication is based on his understanding of the doctrine of divine simplicity.[8] Everything that exists in God does so fully and perfectly, without any partition or complexity. Hence the phrase, “All that is in God is God.”[9] However, in human beings, these things exist in a fragmented and imperfect form, all the more so after the entrance of sin into our world. No human being possesses the fullness of goodness like God does, for God is goodness.
Note how Aquinas writes that “every effect”—in this case, every created thing—that is not “an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause”—here meaning that our power is not equal to the infinite power of the one who created us—does not receive “the similitude of the agent” in its “fullest degree”. (Aquinas often uses the term similitude, which is synonymous with a likeness or image.) This is very technical language, but the meaning is this: our power “falls short” of that of our Creator, even as our love and everything else falls short. Do not think here of the kind of falling short referenced by the Apostle Paul when he said that “all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God”. (Romans 3:23 NASB) This type of falling short is not the result of a moral failing, but our very creaturehood.
Why does everything fall short in creatures? Because “what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner”. Now, God is the agent, and we are the effects, for he acted to create us. He is what philosophers in the tradition of Aristotle would call our efficient cause: the thing that acts upon us and causes us to be. When God created, that which existed in him simply, eternally, and infinitely produced a multitude of effects in his creation. This is what Aquinas means when he speaks of something “divided and multiplied in the effects”. God himself was not divided or multiplied, nor was his being. (Such thoughts tend toward pantheism, not monotheism.) Rather, Aquinas gives us a metaphor: the sun shines its light on many things, producing different effects in all of them. Creatures then are not like fragmented bits of the sun. They have their own existence separate from God, yet are created and sustained by him.
Here we are getting at the very nature of creaturely existence in comparison to God’s existence. While Aquinas does speak about being in general (Latin ens communes, a term that causes some to object to Aquinas’ teachings), he denies that our being or essence is one and the same with God’s. God is simple while we are not. Because God is simple, his being cannot be divided as ours can. (As an example, we have both a body and a soul, unlike God.) Aquinas therefore concludes that God’s being is superior to our being such that univocal predication is impossible between the two.
The same sentiment can be found in an earlier work from Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei (On the Power of God), which was written around the early 1260s.
“I answer that it is impossible for anything to be predicated univocally of God and a creature: this is made plain as follows. Every effect of an univocal agent is adequate to the agent’s power: and no creature, being finite, can be adequate to the power of the first agent which is infinite. Wherefore it is impossible for a creature to receive a likeness to God univocally. Again it is clear that although the form in the agent and the form in the effect have a common ratio, the fact that they have different modes of existence precludes their univocal predication: thus though the material house is of the same type as the house in the mind of the builder, since the one is the type of the other; nevertheless house cannot be univocally predicated of both, because the form of the material house has its being in matter, whereas in the builder’s mind it has immaterial being. Hence granted the impossibility that goodness in God and in the creature be of the same kind, nevertheless good would not be predicated of God univocally: since that which in God is immaterial and simple, is in the creature material and manifold. Moreover being is not predicated univocally of substance and accident, because substance is a being as subsisting in itself, while accident is that whose being is to be in something else. Wherefore it is evident that a different relation to being precludes an univocal predication of being. Now God’s relation to being is different from that of any creature’s: for he is his own being, which cannot be said of any creature.”[10]
Here Aquinas begins by stating again that it is “impossible for anything to be predicated univocally of God and a creature”. As he would later do in the Summa Theologiae, he appeals to the fact that a finite creature cannot be “adequate to the power” of the infinite Creator or “first agent”. Although human beings bear the image of God, “it is impossible for a creature to receive a likeness to God univocally”. We reflect something of God even as the sun’s light reflects off of things on earth, but to be an image of a thing is not to be the thing itself. The major difference Aquinas singles out here is finitude vs. infinitude, or put more simply, the fact that we are finite beings and God is an infinite being. This difference precludes the possibility of univocal predication.
Aquinas gives another metaphor to help us. A builder has a mental image of a house and then creates the house in physical reality. While the house he had in mind may look like the house he ended up building, they are not one and the same house. One of them has a material existence and the other has an immaterial existence. The comparison here would be that God is immaterial (not composed of physical matter), whereas human beings are material. This alone demonstrates that the Creator and his creatures have different modes of existence. That which is in God is “immaterial and simple”, while in us it is “material and manifold”. The difference here is not just one of descriptors, but of being itself. As Aquinas concludes, “Now God’s relation to being is different from that of any creature’s: for he is his own being, which cannot be said of any creature.”
Again referring back to the classical doctrine of divine simplicity, in God there is no difference between essence and existence—between what he is and how he is. Creatures, on the other hand, are created by definition. Nothing brought God into existence, but God brought us into existence. God does not have an efficient cause outside of himself, whereas we do. Our efficient cause is God. Therefore, Aquinas concludes most definitely that we cannot predicate terms univocally between God and creatures, contra the teachings of Duns Scotus.
Aquinas’ Preferred Method of Predication: Analogy
We have seen that Aquinas rejects univocal predication in the case of God, but we have not yet explored what form of predication he accepts. We began to see the answer when he said that God and creatures have “a common ratio” although they have “different modes of existence”.[11] What does it mean to have a common ratio in this context? I believe Aquinas is referencing his belief that while there is a difference between the being of God and that of creatures, there is also an analogy between them. They are not one and the same, but they are related by way of analogy. Let us test this theory by examining another passage in the Summa Theologiae.
“Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing; thus ‘healthy’ applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health.”[12]
Aquinas explains here that when it comes to the relation of creatures to their Creator, a “mean” or middle ground is needed between “pure equivocation” and “simple univocation”. In other words, when we speak of both God and a human being having the trait of goodness, we are not using the word in two completely unrelated ways, but neither are we using the word in exactly the same way. Aquinas writes that analogies are not “one and the same”, nor are they “totally diverse”. Rather, analogical predication of a term occurs when “a multiple sense signifies various proportionsto some one thing”. (emphasis added) Note the similarity here between the words ratio and proportion. Both signify a relation between meanings rather like a kind of mirroring. Perhaps you have changed the size of a photo on your digital device without changing its overall ratio or mathematic proportions. This is the idea Aquinas intends to draw to our minds.
To further demonstrate his point, Aquinas appeals to a very common example of how the same term can take on different implications depending on the context. Indeed, if you have ever had someone explain forms of predication to you and they haven’t appealed to the notion of health, you are almost certainly in the minority. (Theologians and philosophers aren’t as original as they might like you to think.) Aquinas notes that if we remark that urine is healthy, we mean it is a sign of the creature’s health, whereas if we say that medicine is healthy, we mean it should be the cause of good health. The two meanings are not exactly the same nor wholly different: they are related to one another. This is Aquinas’ middle ground of analogical predication.
But What Kind of Analogy?
Aquinas went further than simply defining analogical predication. He also subdivided analogy into multiple forms and specified which one applies to our language about God. Consider the following logical progression in the Summa Contra Gentiles.
“[1] From what we have said, therefore, it remains that the names said of God and creatures are predicated neither univocally nor equivocally but analogically, that is, according to an order or reference to something one.
[2] This can take place in two ways. In one way, according as many things have reference to something one. Thus, with reference to one health we say that an animal is healthy as the subject of health, medicine is healthy as its cause, food as its preserver, urine as its sign.
[3] In another way, the analogy can obtain according as the order or reference of two things is not to something else but to one of them. Thus, being is said of substance and accident according as an accident has reference to a substance, and not according as substance and accident are referred to a third thing.
[4] Now, the names said of God and things are not said analogically according to the first mode of analogy, since we should then have to posit something prior to God, but according to the second mode.”[13]
Here Aquinas begins by repeating his opinion that names spoken of both God and creatures are not univocal or equivocal but analogical, meaning that they are spoken with reference to something, i.e. the two uses are related through their common connection to something. He then differentiates between two such types of reference. In one case, two things are each referred to a third thing. In the other, one thing is referred to the other thing.
To use a rather poor example of my own, a human being and an orangutan could both be referred to the word primate, as the two are connected by their mutual incorporation in that group. This is the first kind of analogical reference. Thus, when we refer to different things as healthy, we refer them all back to the concept of health.
The second kind of analogical reference is the one Aquinas insists applies to God. Here he says “the order or reference of two things is not to something else but to one of them”. The example he gives is a metaphysical one: he compares the terms substance and accident with the term being. However, our chief interest is in what he has to say about God. Since there is nothing prior to God, either chronologically or logically, any analogical predication involving God and creatures is a reference to God, not something prior to him. There is no concept of being that came before God or on which God is dependent. Rather, God is the self-existent one whose essence and existence are one and the same. He is the efficient cause of all other things, and nothing caused or acted upon him. Again, this is coming straight out of the classical doctrine of divine simplicity.
This is important for us to note, because some have taken Aquinas’ references to a concept of being in general to mean that he believes there is something more fundamental to existence than God himself, that various things had to come together to make God, or that something about God was divided up and placed into all of us. Aquinas is very clear that this is not what he means by an analogy of being or analogical predication. The analogy is of a type where one thing is referred to the other thing. Creatures are referred to God: they are not both referred to being.
Aquinas made essentially the same point in another of his works, On the Power of God.
“We must accordingly take a different view and hold that nothing is predicated univocally of God and the creature: but that those things which are attributed to them in common are predicated not equivocally but analogically. Now this kind of predication is twofold. The first is when one thing is predicated of two with respect to a third: thus being is predicated of quantity and quality with respect to substance. The other is when a thing is predicated of two by reason of a relationship between these two: thus being is predicated of substance and quantity. In the first kind of predication the two things must be preceded by something to which each of them bears some relation: thus substance has a respect to quantity and quality: whereas in the second kind of predication this is not necessary, but one of the two must precede the other. Wherefore since nothing precedes God, but he precedes the creature, the second kind of analogical predication is applicable to him but not the first.”[14]
I do not believe any commentary is necessary with regard to this passage, as it is directly in line with what Aquinas wrote in the Summa Contra Gentiles. A third work puts a slightly different spin on the issue while still saying essentially the same thing.
“Therefore such terms are not predicated altogether equivocally about God and about other things, as happens in fortuitous equivocation. Consequently they are predicated according to analogy, that is, according to their proportion to one thing. For, from the fact that we compare other things with God as their first origin, we attribute to God such names as signify perfections in other things. This clearly brings out the truth that, as regards the assigning of the names, such names are primarily predicated of creatures, inasmuch as the intellect that assigns the names ascends from creatures to God. But as regards the thing signified by the name, they are primarily predicated of God, from whom the perfections descend to other beings.”[15]
In the above paragraph from Aquinas’ Compendium of Theology, he describes how an analogy can be viewed from two different points of view. He stresses that when “we compare other things with God as their first origin, we attribute to God such names as signify perfections in other things”. That is, if we say that a human being is just, we do not signify the infinite justice of God, but rather a finite justice. Even so, this justice represents a positive quality in the human being who is reflecting or imaging the justice of his or her first origin, which is God.
Therefore, when we give the same name to creatures and their Creator, Aquinas says these names “are primarily predicated of creatures, inasmuch as the intellect that assigns the names ascends from creatures to God”. I believe he explains things this way because having finite intellects, we naturally ascend from the finite to whatever we can grasp of the infinite. However, Aquinas also writes that “as regards the thing signified by the name, they are primarily predicated of God, from whom the perfections descend to other beings”.
It seems that his meaning is that while our minds naturally work up from the creaturely to the divine, the concept in truth goes in the other direction. The perfections of God descend to other beings rather than human perfections ascending to God. We can sense some things about God by looking at the best aspects of creatures and imagining them in an infinite perfection, but this method is merely the result of our limitations. In truth, all perfection comes from God to us through creation and is made clear to us through divine revelation.
The Gulf Between Divine and Creaturely Existence
While some argue that Aquinas posits too little difference between the finite and the infinite, he himself was clear that there was a great gulf between the two. As he wrote in the Summa Theologiae, “Now it is clear that between God and man there is the greatest inequality: for they are infinitely apart, and all man’s good is from God. Hence there can be no justice of absolute equality between man and God, but only of a certain proportion, inasmuch as both operate after their own manner.”[16]
This word “proportion” is Aquinas’ constant refrain and the basis for his analogy of being. We are related to God by virtue of the fact that he created us in his image and we therefore bear some proportion to him. That does not mean we are divine or even semi-divine. It simply means that we are images that, when empowered by the Holy Spirit, reflect back some of the perfections of God in a finite manner. Our perfections, such as they are, can only be compared to God’s analogically and not univocally due to the doctrine of divine simplicity. This was argued by Aquinas in what is perhaps his most important metaphysical work, Ente et Essentia (On Being and Essence). “But he has these perfections in a more excellent way than all things because in him they are one, whereas in other things they have diversity. And this is so because all these perfections belong to him according to his simple existence.”[17]
The ancient Greek philosopher Parmenides had taught that all being is one, but Aquinas rejected this, arguing instead for an analogy of being. He provided the reason in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
“But they were mistaken in this matter, because they used being as if it were one in intelligible structure and in nature, like the nature of any genus. But this is impossible. For being is not a genus but is predicated of different things in many ways. Therefore in Book I of the Physics it is said that the statement ‘Being is one’ is false. For being does not have one nature like one genus or one species.”[18]
Here we see again that Aquinas does not speak of God’s being and our being in the same way. They are two different forms of existence, not two members of a genus. Being, according to the Angelic Doctor, “is predicated of different things in many ways”. The predication occurs through an analogy: the analogy of being.
Conclusion
In this article, I discussed the primary forms of predication referenced in medieval scholastic theology. I used several quotes from the works of Thomas Aquinas to demonstrate that he rejected univocal predication between God and creatures, arguing instead for analogical predication. I then attempted to arrive at a working definition of analogy according to Aquinas, and specifically to examine that way he used it in relation to God’s being and that of creatures. If I have the chance to write further articles, I will explore other related topics and attempt to answer the question of what, if any, place the analogia entis should have in Reformed theology. But first it is necessary to simply understand it.
[1] Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics, I/1: The Doctrine of the Word of God: The Word of God as the Criterion of Dogmatics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2004), xiii.
[2] PLEASE NOTE: Since I conducted most of my research for this article, one of the websites hosting many English translations of Aquinas’ works, the DHS Priory, has removed its content due to copyright concerns. I will continue to use these translations, as they come from genuine published books, but I will no longer include the web addresses where I accessed them, for they have become dead links. It will be necessary for readers to seek out hard copies of the books in order to double check these quotes.
[3] Throughout these articles, I will alternate between the original Latin and most common English titles for Aquinas’ works depending on what seems most suitable in context. If the Latin is given, I will sometimes provide an English translation in parentheses.
[4] Long, Steven A. Analogia Entis: On the Analogy of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of Faith (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011), 4.
[5] Contrary to popular belief, the term scholastic used in this context does not indicate a particular theological ideology. Rather, it refers to a method of conducting theology that was popular in the schools (here meaning primarily the universities and cathedral schools) of the mid to late medieval period, beginning in the late 11th or early 12th century and lasting roughly until the 15th or early 16th century. It relied heavily on methods of learning pioneered by the ancient Greek philosophers, many of whose writings had recently been rediscovered and/or translated into Latin for the first time. To speak of a monolithic opinion held by scholastic theologians is therefore to commit a fallacy: there were multiple schools of thought represented among them. For a good survey of scholastic theology, including methods and history, I recommend the following book: Introduction to Scholastic Theology by Ulrich G. Leinsle, translated by Michael J. Miller, Catholic University of America Press, copyright 2010.
[6] Duns Scotus. Philosophical Writings, Trans. Allan Wolter, O.F.M. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 19-20.
[7] Aquinas, Thomas. The Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas, Second and Revised Edition (Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1920), I.13.5. http://newadvent.org/summa/1012.htm
[8] If you are unfamiliar with this doctrine or need a refresher, you may wish to reference my article, “Introduction to Divine Simplicity”.
[9] Variations on this phrase with the same basic meaning can be found throughout Church history, but I have not been able to identify a specific originator.
[10] Aquinas, Thomas. On the Power of God (Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei), Trans. English Dominican Fathers (Westminster, MD: The Newman Press, 1952), 7.7.
[11] Aquinas, On the Power of God, 7.7.
[12] Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I.13.5.
[13] Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Contra Gentiles, Trans. Anton C. Pegis, I.34.
[14] Aquinas, Thomas. On the Power of God, 7.7.
[15] Aquinas, Thomas. Compendium of Theology (Compendium Theologiae), Trans. Cyril Vollert S.J. (St. Louis & London: B. Herder Book Company, 1947), I.27.
[16] Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II.114.1.
[17] Aquinas, Thomas. On Being and Essence (De Ente et Essentia), Trans. unknown, Ed. Joseph Kenny, O.P., (1965), 91.
[18] Aquinas, Thomas. Commentary on the Metaphysics, Trans. John P. Rowan (Chicago: 1961), I.9.138-9.
